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7
Self-Government Agreements and 
Canadian Courts
Stephen M. McGilligan
Introduction 
Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognized and affirmed the existing 
Aboriginal and treaty rights of the Aboriginal peoples of Canada, including the 
inherent right of Aboriginal peoples to self-government.1 The framers were silent 
as to the scope and content of these rights, relying on a series of constitutional 
conferences held between 1983 and 1987 designed to define these rights, but with 
little success.2 This shifted the responsibility to the courts, which have under-
standably been reluctant to deal with what they perceive to be a political issue 
best settled through negotiations. In R. v. Sparrow, Dickson C.J. and La Forest 
J. stated, “Section 35(1) at the least, provides a constitutional base upon which 
subsequent negotiations can take place.”3 Seven years later, Chief Justice Lamer 
admonished the parties in Delgamuukw v. The Queen to consider negotiation as 
an alternative to re-litigating their dispute and warned that “the Crown is under 
a moral, if not a legal duty, to enter into and conduct those negotiations in good 
faith.”4 Thus, the Supreme Court has made its preference for negotiation in deter-
mining Aboriginal rights clear. 
Viewed as a human right, self-determination may be considered the founda-
tion upon which all other rights lie. Russel Barsh has described it as the most 
dynamic of all issues considered by international law and the right from which all 
other rights are said to flow.5 While cited as a founding principle of the Charter of 
the United Nations and reflected in the International Human Rights Covenants, 
the term itself remains largely undefined. Despite a lack of consensus as to its 
parameters, certain characteristics have been identified as embodying the prin-
ciples of self-determination, including the right to be free from discrimination, 
respect for cultural integrity, social and welfare development, control over lands 
and resources, and the right of a people to a government of their own making.6 
General claims of self-determination bring with them more specific claims of 
political sovereignty and redress for historic episodes of discrimination that have 
marked the relationship between the group claiming the right and the dominant 
society in which they exist. For Aboriginal leaders in Canada, self-government 
(the political manifestation of self-determination) has emerged as pivotal in their 
quest to redefine their communities. Through models of self-government they 
seek to address important developmental issues concerning poverty, unemploy-
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ment, lack of community infrastructure, and a widening socio-economic gap 
between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. 
There is also mounting support for policies of self-government from non-
Aboriginal governments, reflecting a sense of acknowledgement that historic 
policies of assimilation have failed. This support has at least in part been fuelled by 
overwhelming evidence that successful development within Aboriginal communi-
ties is linked to control over the decision-making process by Aboriginal community 
leaders.7 Professors Cornell and Kalt have summarized the importance of self-
determination to tribal success stating, “Not only does tribal sovereignty work, 
but the evidence indicates that a federal policy of supporting the freedom of Indian 
nations to govern their own affairs, control their own resources and determine their 
own future is the only policy that works. Everything else has failed.”8 
While complex matters related to the sharing or division of governing powers 
is undoubtedly better suited to negotiation than litigation without a clear message 
from the Court providing substance to the inherent right of self-government, 
Aboriginal negotiators come to the bargaining table in a weakened position. In 
this paper I will first examine different kinds of jurisdiction and the potential 
sources of Aboriginal peoples’ self-government jurisdiction. I then examine the 
way in which the Supreme Court has articulated the right of self-government for 
Aboriginal communities and the ramifications that this has had on the negotiating 
process. Finally, I attempt to provide an alternative solution that may allow the 
Court to shift its focus away from the current test used to determine the existence 
of the right of self-government.
Source of Self-Government Jurisdiction 
Jurisdiction refers to political power and the ability of a government to effectively 
make decisions. It can be exercised over territories or people and, in some cases, 
over a combination of the two.9 Along with this, jurisdiction can be exercised 
either exclusively or concurrently and, finally, jurisdiction can be either delegated 
or inherent.
Territorial jurisdiction refers to a class of powers attached to a specific geographic 
territory, such as the traditional lands of an Aboriginal group, and allows for the 
management and regulation of activities related to the lands, including traditional 
activities such as hunting and fishing along with more modern activities such as 
the development of land codes. At the same time, territorial jurisdiction may also 
involve the regulation of the activities of people physically present within the 
geographic confines of the territory. 
Personal jurisdiction refers to the ability of an Aboriginal government to 
enact laws that are applicable to its citizens, in some instances even when those 
citizens are physically located outside the governing territory of the community.10 
Personal jurisdiction can involve jurisdiction over a class of powers, including 
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education, health care, social and welfare services, the solemnization of marriage, 
and adoption.
Along with this, jurisdiction can be either exclusive or concurrent. Exclusive 
jurisdiction refers to authority being exercised by only one level of government. 
This could be either the federal or provincial government or, in some special cases, 
an Aboriginal government.11 Concurrent jurisdiction involves shared authority 
between two or more levels of government and requires the development of 
rules for dealing with overlapping claims of jurisdictional authority and conflict 
between levels of government. For example, Section 95 of the Constitution Act, 
1867 recognizes that both the provinces and federal government may make laws 
pertaining to the regulation of agriculture and immigration, but provides that 
provincial law in either of these fields shall have effect only “as long and as far as 
it is not repugnant to any Act of Parliament of Canada.”12 
Finally, jurisdiction can be either delegated or inherent. Prior to 1982, the 
Government of Canada and the various provincial legislatures exercised juris-
dictional authority delegated through the Constitution Act, 1867.13 In Canada, 
municipal governments operate under authority delegated to them through provin-
cial legislation and are often recognized as being “creatures of the province,” 
while the territorial governments exercise authority delegated to them from 
the federal government. Similarly, Aboriginal band councils exercise authority 
delegated to them by the federal government through the Indian Act.14 Such an 
approach views the existence or non-existence of Aboriginal rights, including the 
right of self-government, as contingent upon the exercise of state authority in the 
granting of such rights.15
Inherent jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to jurisdictional authority of a 
first order, one not reliant on the actions or approval of a higher authority to bring 
it about. For Aboriginal peoples, this means that the right to govern is not reliant 
on treaties nor is it reliant on Canadian law for its existence. Thus, to Aboriginal 
peoples, while Section 35(1) may have acknowledged the existence of, and given 
constitutional protection to, Aboriginal rights (including the inherent right of self-
government) it did not create them. 
To Aboriginal peoples, the source of this inherent right to govern comes from 
the Creator who placed Aboriginal peoples on earth to serve as stewards of the land 
and all that it provides.16 It was this relationship with the Creator that provided the 
framework for the political and other institutions and laws that allowed Aborig-
inal peoples to survive as nations.17 Oren Lyons has stated, 
What are aboriginal rights? They are the law of the Creator. 
That is why we are here; he put us on this land. He did not put 
the white people here; he put us here with our families, and by 
that I mean the bears, the deer, and other animals. We are the 
aboriginal people and we have a right to look after all life on 
this earth. We share land in common not only among ourselves 
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but with the animals and everything that lives in our land. It is 
our responsibility. Each generation must fulfill its responsibility 
to the Creator. Our forefathers did their part, and now we have 
to do ours. Aboriginal rights means aboriginal responsibility, 
and we were put here to fulfill that responsibility.18
The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples noted that to Aboriginal peoples 
the term “sovereignty” referred to original powers conferred upon them by the 
Creator rather than from some temporal power. Thus, it can neither be given nor 
taken away.19  
While not rejecting such spiritual claims, the Supreme Court has chosen to 
frame the inherent rights of Aboriginal peoples on more Eurocentric grounds, 
basing it on the common law principle of prior occupancy. For example, in R. v. 
Van der Peet Lamer C.J. recognized the prior occupancy of Aboriginal peoples, 
stating that Aboriginal rights exist because Aboriginal peoples were already living 
in distinct societies when Europeans came to North America.20   
If the source of the Aboriginal right of self-government is the Creator, what is 
the scope of that right? Logically the spectrum of governing authority could range 
anywhere from complete authority over all potential issues that may fall within 
the scope of a governing body, including things that may have been outside the 
contemplated matters of government centuries ago, to a much lesser amount of 
power delegated to an Aboriginal government by the Creator.21 
Leroy Little Bear has equated the relationship between Aboriginals and all other 
living things as similar to the social contracts designed by Locke and Rousseau.22 
The difference is that while these philosophers constructed their social contract 
theory to encompass only human beings, Professor Little Bear suggests that to 
Aboriginal peoples the social contract embraced all living things.23 As a result of 
this contract, whatever jurisdiction Aboriginal peoples originally acquired from 
the Creator could not simply be transferred to another party. To do so would be 
to break the conditions under which authority had been granted from the Creator. 
Professor Kent McNeil has argued that any authority not given to an Aboriginal 
nation by the Creator would not necessarily create a jurisdictional vacuum that a 
colonial government could usurp. Such an action he suggests, would “interfere 
with the sacred relationship between the Aboriginal nation and the Creator and 
would violate Aboriginal understandings of the place of human beings in the 
natural world.”24 
The scope of Aboriginal authority can be further exemplified by using the 
common law approach of prior occupancy. When the Europeans arrived rather 
than finding lands that were terra nullius they found lands occupied by Aboriginal 
peoples. As George Erasmus and Joe Sanders have stated, “Our people decided 
their own citizenship. They had a wide variety and diversity of governmental 
systems, almost all of them regulating their activities and the relations among 
their members with a degree of formality.”25 
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We can conclude from this that Aboriginal peoples perceive inherent rights, 
including the right of self-government as flowing from a spiritual source, one 
that created a partnership between the Aboriginal peoples and all other living 
things. Any limits placed on these rights are not man-made, but rather come in 
the form of limitations introduced by the Creator, which do not create voids from 
which other governments might claim sovereign authority. Alternatively, Aborigi-
nal rights flow from their prior occupancy and the fact that they were living in 
organized societies long before the arrival of European colonists; therefore, they 
have a common law legal claim that was neither extinguished by clear legislative 
acts nor forfeited by the Aboriginal peoples. It is these issues that Canadian courts 
are currently attempting to grapple with. 
Self-Government as a Free-Standing Right 
(i) R. v. Sparrow 
In Sparrow, the Supreme Court of Canada had its first opportunity to provide 
an interpretation as to the scope and content of the Aboriginal rights recognized 
and affirmed by Section 35(1). In this case Ronald Sparrow, a member of the 
Musqueam Indian Band, was charged under the federal Fisheries Act with fishing 
with a drift net that exceeded the length allowed under the band’s food fishing 
licence.26 Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. began by interpreting the term “existing” 
in Section 35(1) as referring to rights that were in existence when the Constitu-
tion Act, 1982 came into effect. As a result, any rights which had previously been 
extinguished were not revived by the Constitution Act, 1982.27
The Court found that the right to fish existed in 1982, and that the right had 
never been extinguished, noting that the fact that the right was heavily regulated 
prior to 1982 did not necessarily equate to extinguishment.28 Concluding that the 
right to fish had not been extinguished prior to 1982, the Aboriginal right must 
therefore have been in existence at that time and therefore came under the consti-
tutional protection of Section 35. 
The Court concluded that the terms “recognition and affirmation,” as used in 
Section 35, create a fiduciary obligation on the Crown to import restraint on the 
exercise of sovereign power. The Court noted that rights protected by Section 35 
were not absolute, despite the fact that they were not subject to the limitations of 
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.29    
The Sparrow Court did not deal with the issue of self-government, though it 
was given the opportunity. Counsel for Sparrow argued that the right to regulate 
was part of the right to use the resource at the band’s discretion, and therefore the 
authority to regulate the fishing right lay with the Musqueam nation.30 Federal 
authority, they argued, only existed when and if “measures were necessary to 
prevent the serious impairment of the aboriginal rights for present and future 
generations or where conservation could only be achieved by restricting the 
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right and not by restricting fishing by other users and where the aboriginal group 
concerned was unwilling to implement necessary conservation measures.”31 
In Sparrow, the Court connected Aboriginal rights to those activities that were 
an integral part of the Aboriginal group’s distinctive culture. Specifically, the 
Court noted that the Musqueam had always fished for reasons connected to their 
culture and physical survival. Therefore, for the Musqueam the salmon fishery 
had always constituted an integral part of their distinctive culture.32 In taking this 
approach, the Court warned against defining these rights in ways that incorporated 
methods in which they were regulated in the past. Rather, the Court stated, they 
should be interpreted in a flexible manner so as to permit their evolution over a 
period of time. The Court warned that such a flexible approach to the interpreta-
tion of Aboriginal rights was necessary to avoid the potential of creating a “frozen 
rights” approach to their interpretation.33 
While a great deal of focus on the part of the Court in this case was the develop-
ment of the justificatory test for the infringement of fishing rights, the Court did 
take the time to examine the purpose for the inclusion of Section 35(1). It was, they 
stated, “the culmination of a long and difficult struggle in both the political forum 
and the courts for the constitutional recognition of aboriginal rights.”34 The Court 
noted that after decades of ignoring Indian rights as a response to the Supreme 
Court decision in Calder, the federal government chose to recognize and accept 
“its continuing responsibility under the British North America Act, for Indians 
and lands reserved for Indians.”35 From this, the Court derived an approach for 
the interpretation of Section 35(1) rights. Drawing on general constitutional prin-
ciples and previous case law, the Court concluded that, “When the purposes of the 
affirmation of aboriginal rights is considered, it is clear that a generous and liberal 
interpretation of the words in the constitutional provision is demanded.”36 
(ii) R. v. Van der Peet 
On September 11, 1987, Dorothy Van der Peet, a member of the Sto:lo First 
Nation of British Columbia, was charged under the federal Fisheries Act with the 
offence of selling fish caught under the authority of an Indian food fish licence 
contrary to the British Columbia Fishery (General) Regulations.37 Chief Justice 
Antonio Lamer (speaking for the majority) picked up where Dickson C.J. and La 
Forest J. left off in Sparrow, noting that the case before the Court would have to 
address what had been left unresolved in that previous case; namely, how Aborigi-
nal rights recognized and affirmed in Section 35(1) were to be defined. 
To Lamer C.J., the task of the Court was to define Aboriginal rights in such a 
way that they are recognized as rights, but that does not make the court lose focus 
on the fact that they are rights held only by Aboriginal peoples because they are 
Aboriginal peoples. To define the scope of Aboriginal rights the Chief Justice 
stated that it is necessary first to “articulate the purposes which underpin s. 35(1), 
specifically the reasons underlying its recognition and affirmation of the unique 
constitutional status of aboriginal peoples in Canada.”38 He went on to say:
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The Court must neither lose sight of the generalized consti-
tutional status of what s. 35(1) protects, nor can it ignore the 
necessary specificity which comes from granting special consti-
tutional protection to one part of Canadian society. The Court 
must define the scope of s. 35(1) in a way that captures both the 
aboriginal and the rights in aboriginal rights.39
The chief justice affirmed that Aboriginal rights existed and were recognized by 
the common law prior to their constitutional entrenchment stating, “it must be 
remembered that s. 35(1) did not create the legal doctrine of aboriginal rights; 
aboriginal rights existed and were recognized under the common law.”40 The chief 
justice went on to articulate two factors that serve to ground a legal analysis of 
Aboriginal rights: prior occupancy and reconciliation. Drawing on the Court’s 
earlier decision in Calder, Lamer C.J. stated, 
In my view, the doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recog-
nized and affirmed by s. 35(1) because of one simple fact: when 
Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were 
already here, living in communities on the land, and participat-
ing in distinctive cultures, as they had done for centuries.41
As a result, s. 35(1) provides the constitutional framework for the reconciliation 
of pre-existing Aboriginal communities with the subsequent assertions of sover-
eignty by the Crown: “The aboriginal rights which fall within the provision must 
be directed towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies 
with the sovereignty of the Crown.”42
To be an Aboriginal right, Lamer C.J. stated, the activity being claimed “must 
be a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the aboriginal 
group claiming the right.”43 The Court then proceeded to refine the characteriza-
tion of Aboriginal rights first articulated in Sparrow. The Court indicated that the 
nature of the action the applicant was claiming was done pursuant to an Aborigi-
nal right, the government regulation, statute, or action being impugned, and the 
practice, custom, or tradition being relied on to establish the right all needed to be 
considered.44 The chief justice concluded that the appellant in this case was using 
the practices, customs, and traditions to create what he characterized as a “social 
test,” something he found insufficient to ground an Aboriginal right.
To the chief justice it was not sufficient that a claimed right be a practice, 
custom, or tradition that was an aspect of the Aboriginal community claiming 
the right. Rather the right must be integral to the distinctive culture of the group 
claiming the right. To satisfy this, the claimant must, according to the majority of 
the Court, show that the practice, custom, or tradition was a central and significant 
part of the society’s distinctive culture: “He or she must demonstrate, in other 
words, that the practice, custom or tradition was one of the things which made 
the culture of the society distinctive—that it was one of the things that truly made 
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the society what it was.”45 To Lamer C.J. it was not those aspects of an Aboriginal 
society that were common with other societies (such as eating to survive) that 
would satisfy the integral-to-the-distinctive-culture test, but rather “the defining 
and central attributes of the aboriginal society in question. It is only by focusing 
on the aspects of the aboriginal society that make that society distinctive that the 
definition of aboriginal rights will accomplish the purpose underlying s. 35(1).”46
Finally, the chief justice concluded that the test for establishing Aboriginal 
rights must be aimed at identifying those rights that were practices, traditions, and 
customs central to the Aboriginal societies that were in North America prior to 
contact with Europeans.47 This makes sense based on Lamer C.J.’s early caution 
that Aboriginal rights should be defined in a manner that recognizes they are 
Aboriginal rights, but that does not “lose sight of the fact that they are rights held 
by aboriginal people because they are aboriginal.”48
Sparrow and Van der Peet were foundational cases in the development of 
the scope and content of Aboriginal rights, but what do they tell us about these 
rights? In Sparrow, the Court accepted the notion that Canada held sovereign 
authority over the Aboriginal peoples and thus has the authority to legislate on 
issues concerning them.49 The Court acknowledged that Aboriginal rights existed 
and were absorbed into the common law and that those rights, still existing in 
1982, were raised to constitutionally protected status when they were recognized 
and affirmed in Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. As a result of this, 
they were no longer subject to unilateral extinguishment, and the regulation of 
these rights needed to conform to the strict justification test outlined by the Court 
in Sparrow. This test called for adequate consultation of Aboriginal peoples prior 
to any infringement of their rights. The Court embraced an inherent theory of 
Aboriginal rights in Sparrow by recognizing that the Musqueam right to fish arose 
from the fact that it constituted an integral part of their distinctive culture and 
was a necessary condition of their historic self-preservation. As a result of this, 
Aboriginal rights were defined as those rights that were essential to the Aborigi-
nal peoples claiming the rights. In reaching this conclusion, Dickson C.J. and La 
Forest J. warned that Aboriginal rights must be interpreted in a flexible manner 
to allow for their evolution over time, warning that to disregard this was to risk 
creating a frozen rights approach to the interpretation of these rights.
Critics warned that this decision ran the risk of undermining the larger goal of 
Aboriginal leaders, namely the achievement of self-government and the develop-
ment of an independent economic base.50 Prior to his appointment to the Supreme 
Court, W. I. C. Binnie warned that “the checks and balances of the Constitution, 
do not favour both a liberal and generous reading of the rights and a high level 
of immunity.”51 Michael Asch and Patrick Macklem noted that while the Court 
appears to initially embrace an inherent theory of Aboriginal rights in Sparrow, 
it attempts to avoid what it anticipated would be a major concern—the inherent 
right of Aboriginal peoples to self-government—by merely accepting the notion 
of Canadian sovereignty over the Aboriginal population. As a result of this sover-
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eignty, any rights provided must be contingent upon the state for their distribu-
tion.52   
Van der Peet attempted to pick up where Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. left 
off in Sparrow. In Van der Peet, it was argued that Aboriginal rights must be 
viewed differently than other rights because they inhere to one group, the Aborigi-
nal peoples of Canada. This required that they be examined with a degree of 
necessary specificity. Lamer C.J. recognized the prior occupancy of Aboriginal 
peoples and concluded that this prior occupancy must be reconciled with the later 
assertions of sovereignty by the Crown. The Court then refined the test initially 
introduced in Sparrow, determining that an Aboriginal right must be a practice, 
custom, or tradition that was integral to the distinctive culture of the claimant 
group and providing a time frame for the claiming of such rights as a period prior 
to contact with Europeans. 
Van der Peet raised several concerns relating to Aboriginal governance. 
First, while attempting to resolve questions left by Sparrow, the Van der Peet 
majority appears to have failed to adequately consider the Aboriginal perspective 
when examining Aboriginal rights. While concluding that a court must take into 
account the perspective of the Aboriginal group claiming the right, in the very 
next sentence Lamer C.J. indicated that these rights must be “framed in terms 
cognizable to the Canadian legal and constitutional structure.”53 As professors 
Kent McNeil and David Yarrow have noted in relation to this aspect of the Van 
der Peet decision, “Regarding characterization of the claim, it appears that while 
the perspective of the Aboriginal peoples making the claim has to be taken into 
account, it is not the governing factor.”54 Such an approach will have a tendency to 
weaken potential claims for Aboriginal peoples as they are forced to reshape and 
frame their claims to fit into a Western judicial framework, thus possibly leading 
to the diminishment of Aboriginal perspectives.55 
The second major concern raised by the decision in Van der Peet, and fore-
shadowed by W. I. C. Binnie, is that claims to self-government will be limited 
to whatever authority an Aboriginal claimant group is able to make on a piece-
by-piece basis. Thus, claims would be confined to those areas that can be proven 
to be integral to the distinctive culture of the specific claimant group and that 
were regulated by them prior to contact with Europeans, in some cases requiring 
a back-dating in excess of four hundred years.56 This has led the Van der Peet 
decision to be seen as advocating a “frozen rights approach.” McNeil has noted, 
“This might eliminate claims relating to many of the matters that have become the 
business of government in more recent times, effectively hampering the capacity 
of First Nations governments to function effectively in the modern world.”57
Criticism of the majority test in Van der Peet was swift. In her dissenting 
opinion, Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé recommended the adoption of a 
“dynamic rights approach” over that of a “frozen rights approach” for several 
reasons. Firstly, she argued that relying on contact with Europeans as the 
cut-off for the development of Aboriginal practices, customs, and traditions 
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overemphasizes European influence on Aboriginal communities. Secondly, 
contact with Europeans is an arbitrary date for assessing all Aboriginal rights. 
She also argued that using this frozen rights approach “imposes a heavy and 
unfair burden on the natives” by embodying inappropriate assumptions about the 
Aboriginal group that, in the end, they may not be able to prove. Finally, she 
argued that the frozen rights approach to interpretation of Aboriginal rights was 
inconsistent with the position taken by the Court in Sparrow.58 
McLachlin J. was just as critical. Noting that one must distinguish between 
an Aboriginal right and the exercise of that right (the former is generally cast in 
broad language while the latter may take many forms from time to time), she criti-
cized the notion of examining these rights under a microscope of “necessary spec-
ificity” stating, “If a modern practice is treated as the right at issue, the analysis 
may be foreclosed before it begins.” She then noted that a modern practice 
by which the more fundamental right is exercised may not find a counterpart 
in a historic Aboriginal culture. Sharing many of the concerns of her colleague 
Madame Justice L’Heureux-Dubé, McLachlin J. summarized by stating, “To fail 
to recognize the distinction between rights and the contemporary form in which 
the rights are exercised is to freeze aboriginal societies in their ancient modes and 
deny to them the right to adapt, as all peoples must, to the changes in the society 
in which they live.”59
Criticism within the academic community was no less intense. Professor John 
Borrows stated, “The Chief Justice’s test defines Aboriginal rights according to 
stereotypical perceptions of Aboriginal characteristics rather than by their nature 
and source. This approach freezes the development of certain Aboriginal practices 
in the distant past.”60 Russel Barsh and James Youngblood Henderson stated, 
“Taken to its logical extreme, the reconciliation test has the effect of extinguishing 
everything that had not already been judicially recognized in 1982. But this does 
not reflect accurately the aims of the Aboriginal constitutional negotiators, nor 
even those of their non-Aboriginal counterparts.”61 Finally Professor Bradford 
Morse has stated, “The Van der Peet test embroils the judiciary in a quagmire 
of subjective assessments of what is and what is not deserving of constitutional 
protection.”62
(iii) R. v. Pamajewon 
In R. v. Pamajewon, the Court had the opportunity for the first time to address 
the issue of self-government as a free-standing Aboriginal right.63 The case itself 
stemmed from criminal charges against members of two Ontario First Nations 
communities (Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations). The charges were for 
“keeping a common gaming house” contrary to Section 201(1) of the Criminal 
Code. Convicted in the lower court, at the Ontario Court of Appeal the appel-
lants submitted that they had a constitutionally protected Aboriginal right of self-
government that existed either as an incident of Aboriginal title or alternatively as 
an inherent Aboriginal right. The appellants argued that the issue of high-stakes 
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gambling before the court was part of a larger right to manage the economic 
affairs of the reserve as an incident of self-government. At the Ontario Court of 
Appeal these arguments were rejected out of hand. Osborne J.A. indicated that 
no evidence existed that gambling generally or high-stakes gambling particularly 
were part of the First Nations’ historic cultures or traditions, an aspect of their use 
of the lands, or something that had been historically regulated. Along with this, 
Osborne J.A. held that Sparrow was the authority for the proposition that any 
claim to an inherent right of self-government was extinguished by assertions of 
British sovereignty.64 
In rendering its judgment, the Supreme Court chose to assume that self-
government was an Aboriginal right constitutionally protected by Section 35(1). 
Having acknowledged this, the Court concluded that the resolution of the appel-
lant’s claims rested on the proper application of the Van der Peet test (introduced 
only a day earlier) and as such, “claims of self-government are no different than 
other claims to the enjoyment of aboriginal rights and must, as such, be measured 
against the same standard.”65 
Drawing on Van der Peet, Lamer C.J. stated that in characterizing an appli-
cant’s claim correctly a court must consider factors such as the nature of the action 
the applicant is claiming was done pursuant to an Aboriginal right; the nature 
of governing regulations, statutes, or actions being impugned; and the practice, 
custom, or tradition being relied upon to establish the right. Lamer C.J. concluded: 
“When these factors are considered in this case it can be seen that the correct char-
acterization of the appellants’ claim is that they are claiming the right to partici-
pate in, and regulate, high stakes gambling activities on the reservation.”66 Lamer 
C.J. rejected the appellant’s claim that the activity represented the broad right 
to manage the use of their reserve lands, claiming that to do so would “cast the 
Court’s inquiry at a level of excessive generality.”67 Lamer C.J. concluded that 
the evidence presented did not demonstrate that gambling or the regulation of 
gambling was integral to the distinctive cultures of either First Nation and as such, 
did not qualify as an Aboriginal right under the Van der Peet test. 
By using the test created in Van der Peet for the determination of claims to 
self-government, the Court has run a tremendous risk of limiting the right of self-
government to only those activities that were integral to the distinctive culture of 
the Aboriginal group claiming the right at a point prior to contact with Europeans; 
something that may very well result in a freezing of this right and a restriction on 
an Aboriginal government to operate effectively within the present-day state. As 
Catherine Bell has asked, “Did the application of the Van der Peet test to self-
government mean that rights to government would only be recognized by the 
court if characterized in terms of specific pre-contact activities?”68 
In Pamajewon, the Court viewed the right of self-government through the 
lens of what Professor Brian Slattery has identified as specific Aboriginal rights. 
These, he has convincingly argued, are rights that are unique to particular Aborig-
inal groups and are determined by the historic practices, customs, and traditions 
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of the group being examined. As such, these rights may differ from one group to 
the next.69
 This approach to the development of self-government is difficult to accept. 
While some academic commentators have suggested that the outcome of 
Pamajewon may represent a blessing in disguise, for Aboriginal negotiators this 
does not seem to be the case.70 As Kent McNeil has stated, 
With a decision like Pamajewon standing as the main Supreme 
Court precedent on the content of the right of self-government, 
negotiators for non-Aboriginal governments can always say, 
fine, if you don’t like what we are offering then you can go 
to court and try to prove your right of self-government in the 
piecemeal fashion of Pamajewon, but don’t expect to have juris-
diction over any matters that were not integral to your distinc-
tive cultures and regulated by you prior to European contact.71
It seems that almost every segment of the Van der Peet test has been the subject 
of criticism, particularly as it relates to self-government. As indicated above, 
academic commentary has been strongly critical. Surprisingly, the Court chose to 
evaluate a right as important and as potentially broad as self-government by using 
the same test created to determine the constitutional legitimacy of a right to fish 
for food for ceremonial purposes. This appears to run contrary to Canadian consti-
tutional law, which distinguishes between rights to resources and jurisdictional 
authority over those same resources.72 
Limiting claims to self-government to matters that were integral to the distinc-
tive culture of an Aboriginal claimant group prior to contact with Europeans 
seems to be arbitrary at best, and is likely to limit Aboriginal nations’ abilities to 
govern themselves in the modern world in which they find themselves. Finally, by 
fragmenting the right of self-government, the Court has placed an almost insur-
mountable test upon First Nations hoping to make claims under this right. The 
burden of proof is overwhelming and the cost of potentially litigating claims of 
self-government could be enormous given the financial considerations. It would 
require extensive research and expert evidence from a variety of professional 
sources, including historians, anthropologists, and others, not to mention the time 
and cost of legal professionals themselves. This could result in a tremendous drain 
on economic resources that could be used for any number of more practical and 
beneficial needs such as housing, health care, and education, along with any other 
daily social issues that make up the fabric of a society.
However, despite these criticisms and the obvious shortcomings of the current 
test, Pamajewon as a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada is the law of the 
land and will remain so until it is either overturned or modified by some future 
judgement. In the next section of this paper I will examine alternative methods by 
which the Court might be able to approach the issue of self-government.
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Self-Government through Regulation 
(i) Introduction
The Supreme Court decision in Pamajewon supports an “empty box” theory of 
Aboriginal self-government.73 Under such a theory, self-government represents 
nothing more than a bundle of rights. In order for an Aboriginal claimant group 
to acquire any one strand in the bundle as a feature of self-government, it is 
incumbent upon them to first claim the right and then prove that the right itself 
(not the right to govern in a manner they see fit) was an integral part of their 
culture and regulated by them at the time of European contact. 
A second approach to assessing the right of self-government is to associate 
the right to other Aboriginal and treaty rights, particularly rights related to land, 
though this need not necessarily be the case. As noted earlier in this work, in 
Sparrow the Court concluded that, “the evidence reveals that the Musqueam have 
lived in the area as an organized society long before the coming of European 
settlers, and that the taking of salmon was an integral part of their lives and remains 
so today.”74 Further in their decision Dickson C.J. and La Forest J. noted, “The 
aboriginal peoples, with their history of conservation-consciousness and inter-
dependence with natural resources, would surely be expected, at the least, to be 
informed regarding an appropriate scheme for the regulation of the fisheries.”75 In 
this case, the right to fish was determined to be an Aboriginal right because of the 
centrality it held to the Musqueam people. It follows from this that the Musqueam 
must have developed some method of regulating how the activity itself was to 
be carried out, both in relation to its own members and in conjunction with other 
Aboriginal nations.
(ii) Delgamuukw v. British Columbia
More recently, in Delgamuukw, the Supreme Court issued a long-awaited decision 
on the nature of Aboriginal title under Section 35.76 The appellants in that case, 
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en hereditary chiefs, both individually and on behalf of 
their “houses” claimed separate portions of some 58,000 square kilometres in 
British Columbia. They originally sought both ownership and jurisdiction over 
the lands, but at the Supreme Court the claim was amended to consider primarily 
issues of Aboriginal title over the lands in question. 
Lamer C.J. acknowledged the claims to self-government made in the lower 
courts, but concluded that errors of fact made by the trial judge and the resultant 
decision of the Supreme Court to call for a new trial “make it impossible for this 
Court to determine whether claims to self-government have been made out.”77 
While the Supreme Court chose not to deal with the issue of self-government, 
it did reiterate the position established in Pamajewon that claims to self-govern-
ment, “if they existed, cannot be framed in excessively general terms … appel-
lants advanced the right to self-government in very broad terms, and therefore in a 
manner not cognizable under s. 35(1).”78 The trial court and the British Columbia 
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Court of Appeal had both concluded that any right to self-government had been 
extinguished with assertions of Crown sovereignty. In the Court of Appeal, 
MacFarlane J.A. (Taggart J.A. concurring) held that the entry of British Columbia 
into Confederation immediately brought the Aboriginal peoples under the control 
of the government of Canada.79 
However, while not dealing directly with the issue of self-government, in 
prescribing the general features of Aboriginal title at common law Lamer C.J. 
inadvertently opened the door to self-government that was originally introduced 
in Sparrow. Lamer C.J. concluded that Aboriginal title is a collective or communal 
right and, as such, it is the community that must make decisions regarding the 
land: “A further dimension of aboriginal title is the fact that it is held communally. 
Aboriginal title cannot be held by an individual aboriginal person; it is a collective 
right to land held by all member of an aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect 
to that land are also made by the community.”80 This passage appears to signify 
that decision-making authority is linked to Aboriginal title. The Court confirmed 
that Aboriginal title “encompasses the right to choose to what uses land can be 
put, subject to the ultimate limit that those uses cannot destroy the ability of the 
land to sustain future generations of aboriginal peoples.”81 While invoking the 
British real property principle of equitable waste as a limitation, the chief justice 
acknowledged that choices must be made with regard to lands held under Aborigi-
nal title and thus decision-making or governmental authority is at least implicitly 
recognized by this decision. With regard to the communal nature of Aboriginal 
title addressed in Delgamuukw, Professor Kent McNeil has stated, 
There must, for example, be rules and mechanisms for deciding 
which members of the community can use which lands, and for 
what purposes. The communal nature of Aboriginal title rights 
therefore, presupposes the existence of Aboriginal governments 
to distribute the benefits that flow from those rights with the 
community and regulate how they are exercised.82
(iii) R. v. Marshall 
In R. v. Marshall, the accused, a member of the Mi’kmaq Indian nation, was 
charged with offences established by federal fisheries regulations: the selling of 
eels without a licence, fishing without a licence, and fishing during the closed 
season with illegal nets.83 The accused admitted to all the charges, claiming 
he possessed a right under a treaty dating back to 1760–61 that exempted him 
from compliance to the regulations. The Supreme Court found in favour of the 
accused and overturned the findings of the lower courts. The West Nova Fisher-
man’s Coalition applied for a re-hearing to address the regulatory authority of the 
government of Canada over the east coast fisheries, as well as to allow the Crown 
to justify its licensing and creating a closed season in terms of conservation. The 
Court concluded that Aboriginal treaties, like Aboriginal rights, are rights that are 
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not held personally by Aboriginal peoples but rather are “exercised by authority 
of the whole community,” and that any limitation or restriction on Aboriginal 
treaty rights requires consultation with the Aboriginal community prior to such 
restriction.84 
(iv) Campbell v. British Columbia
Campbell v. British Columbia rose out of a challenge to the self-government 
features of the Nisga’a treaty.85 Chapter 11 of that agreement recognizes the 
Nisga’a Nation’s right to self-government and the authority to make laws as 
outlined in the agreement. A constitutional challenge was raised by then-leader 
of the British Columbia opposition party, Gordon Campbell. He challenged the 
settlement legislation enacting the treaty, arguing that the treaty was inconsistent 
with the Canadian constitution and that rights granted under Chapter 11 of the 
agreement were inconsistent with the exhaustive division of powers granted to 
Parliament and the legislative assemblies respectively.
Citing passages from Delgamuukw that refer to the collective and communal 
nature of Aboriginal title, Williamson J. proceeded to examine whether, as the 
plaintiff suggested, a limited right of self-government could not be protected 
constitutionally by Section 35(1). His response was that Aboriginal title in its full 
form, including the right of a community to make decisions with respect to the use 
of lands, required a political structure to make those decisions and was constitu-
tionally protected by Section 35(1). Williamson J. concluded:
A right to self-government akin to a legislative power to make 
laws, survived as one of the unwritten “underlying values” of 
the Constitution outside of the powers distributed to Parliament 
and the legislatures in 1867. The federal-provincial division 
of powers in 1867 was aimed at a different issue and was a 
division “internal” to the Crown.86
The Constitution Act, 1867, conferred upon Parliament and the legislative assem-
blies exclusive authority to govern under the classes of powers enumerated in 
Sections 91 and 92, but it did not extinguish what was left of the royal preroga-
tive or Aboriginal and treaty rights, “including a diminished but not extinguished 
power of self-government which remained with the Nisga’a people in 1982.”87 
Citing Chief Justice Lamer’s conclusion in Delgamuukw that Aboriginal title 
was held communally and that it is held by all members of an Aboriginal nation, 
Williamson J. stated, 
Can it be, as the plaintiffs’ submission would hold, that a 
limited right to self-government cannot be protected constitu-
tionally by Section 35(1)? I think not. The above passages from 
Delgamuukw suggesting the right for the community to decide 
to what uses the land encompassed by their aboriginal title can 
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be put are determinative of the question. The right to aboriginal 
title “in its full form,” including the right for the community to 
make decisions as to the use of the land and therefore the right 
to have a political structure for making those decisions, is, I 
conclude, constitutionally guaranteed by Section 35.88
(v) Haida Nation v. British Columbia
Haida Nation v. British Columbia began with the issuance of a tree farm licence to 
a forestry firm by the Province of British Columbia in 1961.89 In 1999, the Minister 
of Forests transferred the licence to Weyerhaeuser, a large forest concern in the 
province. The Haida nation challenged the transfer, made without their consent, 
and asked that it be set aside. The British Columbia Supreme Court rejected the 
claim, but this decision was reversed at the British Columbia Court of Appeal, 
which declared that the government and Weyerhaeuser had a duty to consult and 
accommodate the Haida people. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the 
Court of Appeal. Speaking for the Court, McLachlin C.J. concluded that both 
federal and provincial governments have a duty to consult, but third parties such 
as Weyerhaeuser did not. However, they could be held liable in instances where it 
was shown that they acted negligently where a duty of care existed, or they were 
in breach of a contract.90 
What can we conclude as to the scope of self-government jurisdiction available 
to Aboriginal peoples through an approach of self-government by regulation? With 
regard to lands claimed under Aboriginal title, this should mean that Aboriginal 
communities have governmental rights over the management, regulation, and use 
of lands, including the resources that are situated either on or under these lands. 
In Delgamuukw, Chief Justice Lamer noted that Aboriginal title also encompassed 
natural resources both on and within title lands.91 
The Haida case centred on unproven claims to Aboriginal title over traditional 
areas of the Queen Charlotte Islands and the surrounding waters. The obligation 
placed on the Province to consult with the Haida in relation to these lands suggests 
once more self-government by regulation. In accordance with Delgamuukw, it is 
the community that must make decisions with regard to the use and enjoyment 
of lands. This, I believe, must take place within the framework of a government. 
(vi) Conclusion 
Within the framework of a treaty agreement, such as the Nisga’a Final Agreement, 
the scope of inherent authority available to an Aboriginal nation would consist of 
those classes of powers outlined in the treaty. However, outside the treaty process, 
such an approach to the inherent right of self-government immediately eliminates 
the so-called “empty box” issues that potentially arise under the Van der Peet 
test. With regard to lands held under Aboriginal title, such an approach to self-
government would immediately offer Aboriginal claimant groups the right to 
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manage and regulate the use of both lands and the resources contained on those 
lands. Finally, how such an approach to self-government might affect other free-
standing rights, such as a right to fish or hunt, needs to be considered. 
Looking back at the Sparrow decision, the Court concluded that the right to 
fish was integral to the Musqueam society. The Court further noted that as a result 
of their history of conservation-consciousness and interdependence with natural 
resources, they were likely to make decisions in the best interest of the future 
of the resource. This coincides with the stewardship notions of self-government 
discussed earlier in this work. Many Aboriginal peoples believe they have an 
intertwining relationship with all things and thus are responsible for ensuring 
that resources are preserved for future generations. I would argue that a free-
standing Aboriginal right, once proven, would include a right to regulate and 
manage the right in question. Interestingly, in a decision rendered merely months 
prior to Sparrow, that same Supreme Court concluded that rights held pursuant to 
Section 23 of the Charter included the right to manage and control the facilities 
in question.92 I am at a loss to understand why the regulation of a constitutionally 
protected Aboriginal right, once established, should be any different. 
Self-Government as a Residual Right of Sovereignty 
Introduction 
A third approach is to presume that Aboriginal nations had full plenary powers 
given to them by the Creator prior to the arrival of Europeans. Any limitations to 
this authority would have been between the Aboriginal peoples and the Creator 
and would not affect any interaction between Aboriginal nations and European 
colonizers. Alternatively, one can accept the fact that Aboriginal nations were fully 
functioning independent peoples prior to the arrival of Europeans and acknowl-
edge the common law doctrines of prior occupancy and prior sovereignty. As 
McLachlin C.J. noted in Haida, “Treaties serve to reconcile pre-existing Aborigi-
nal sovereignty with assumed Crown sovereignty and to define Aboriginal rights 
guaranteed by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”93 In either case, prior to the 
arrival of Europeans, it is a historic fact that Aboriginal peoples were living here 
as nations, with their own set of rules and regulations that dictated the daily norms 
of their lives.
Under such an approach to self-government, rather than beginning with an 
empty box and placing the burden on Aboriginal peoples to fill it on a piece-by-
piece basis as dictated by the Van der Peet test, one begins by assuming the box 
is full and that Aboriginal peoples have full jurisdictional authority within the 
confines of their nations. Removed from the box are any jurisdictional authorities 
that have been either ceded through treaties or extinguished through clear and 
plain legislative actions prior to 1982. Barring that, Aboriginal peoples retain full 
plenary powers within the framework of Canadian federalism.
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Under such an approach the burden of proof would shift and the onus would be 
on the Crown to illustrate that the jurisdictional authority they are claiming has 
actually been diminished or extinguished in some fashion. This is compatible with 
the test for infringement of Aboriginal rights as outlined in Sparrow. In that case it 
was determined that once a prima facie infringement is proven by the Aboriginal 
group claiming the right, the onus shifts to the Crown to justify the infringement 
of the right. Similarly, once a prima facie case of self-government was shown by 
an Aboriginal claimant group, the onus could shift to the Crown to demonstrate 
that the right being claimed has been extinguished either by treaty or legislative 
enactment.94 
American Jurisprudence 
This view of self-government as a residual right of sovereignty is consistent with 
jurisprudence in the United States. In his authoritative work on federal Indian 
law in the United States, Felix Cohen noted, “Perhaps the most basic principles 
of all Indian law, supported by a host of decisions, is that those powers which are 
lawfully vested in an Indian tribe are not, in general, delegated powers granted 
by express Acts of Congress.”95 Rather, they are powers that are “inherent powers 
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”96 In Oliphant v. 
Squamish Indian Tribe, the United States Supreme Court held that “Indian tribes 
still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by 
implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.”97 
Such an approach to self-government begins with the premise that prior to 
the arrival of Europeans, Aboriginal peoples were fully sovereign independent 
nations. Through the colonization process the sovereign authority of these nations 
was necessarily diminished, but they were never extinguished. In Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, the Court concluded that upon discovery, “the rights of the original 
inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded; but were necessarily to a 
considerable extent impaired … their rights to complete sovereignty, as independ-
ent nations, were necessarily diminished.”98
In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall C.J. provided a more definitive 
description on the limitations on tribal sovereignty.99 While acknowledging that 
Indians still had unquestioned rights to the lands they occupied until such rights 
were voluntarily extinguished by cession to the government, the chief justice 
suggested it was doubtful that these tribes still retained a status of foreign nations. 
Rather, the chief justice suggested, they may more accurately be classified as 
“domestic dependent nations.”100 
In another case involving the Cherokee, Worcester v. Georgia, missionaries 
had been arrested and sentenced to four years in prison by the State of Georgia 
for passing into Indian lands without first having obtained a permit from the 
state.101 Marshall C.J. declared the relevant laws to be void as they violated 
treaties between the United States and the Cherokee Indians assuring the Indians’ 
security. In rendering his decision the chief justice stated, “The Cherokee nation 
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is a distinct community occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately 
described, in which the laws of Georgia can have no force and which the citizens 
of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees them-
selves.”102
In United States v. Wheeler, the Court concluded that “primeval sovereignty, 
has never been taken away from them, either explicitly or implicitly, and is attrib-
utable in no way to any delegation to them of federal authority. It follows that 
when the Navajo Tribe exercises this power, it does so as part of its retained 
sovereignty and not as an arm of the federal government.”103 As a result, it was the 
conclusion of the Court in Wheeler that the powers of Indian tribes are inherent 
and while they no longer enjoy the full sovereignty of pre-contact periods, they 
retain all aspects of sovereignty not forfeited by treaty or extinguished by specific 
legislative enactments.
While American Indian tribes clearly have inherent limitations to their 
sovereign powers, the extent to which their powers are sovereign is also extensive 
and includes the power to determine the form of tribal government; the power to 
determine membership; the power to legislate and make substantive criminal and 
civil laws with regard to internal matters including taxation, except where limits 
have been expressly imposed by Congress; the power to legislate; the power to 
exclude persons from tribal territories and in limited circumstances; and authority 
over non-Indians on Indian lands.104 
Canadian Jurisprudence 
We have already seen how the notion of inherent self-government was supported 
in Campbell, in which the court found that the Nisga’a people’s right to self-
government as outlined in the Nisga’a Treaty did not violate the Canadian consti-
tution. Concluding that the powers distributed through Sections 91 and 92 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867 were not exhaustive, Williamson J. drew on American 
jurisprudence and suggested that this gap could be filled by a “diminished but not 
extinguished power of self-government which remained with the Nisga’a people 
in 1982.”105 Williamson J. was careful to note that the Nisga’a treaty, as with all 
Aboriginal and treaty rights, was subject to justifiable infringement and as a result 
the Nisga’a people do not have “absolute or sovereign powers.”106
Mitchell v. M.N.R. involved the question of whether a chief of the Mohawk 
nation had the right to bring goods into Canada from the United States without 
paying custom duties.107 The federal government argued, inter alia, that such 
an action would be incompatible with Crown sovereignty. Having determined 
that the right claimed did not survive based on the evidence, she did, however, 
state that “any Mohawk practice of cross-border trade, even if established on the 
evidence, would be barred from recognition under s. 35(1) as incompatible with 
the Crown’s sovereign interest in regulating its borders.”108
Unlike the chief justice, Binnie J. chose to address the issue of sovereign 
incompatibility directly, concluding that, “the international trading/mobility right 
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claimed by the respondent as a citizen of the Haudenosaunee (Iroquois) Confed-
eracy is incompatible with the historic attributes of Canadian sovereignty.”109 If 
we see this decision in light of the residual sovereignty approach being suggested 
here, it seems clear that international trade would be one of bundles that would 
need to be removed from the previously full box when examining the Aborigi-
nal right of self-government.110 Despite this, Binnie noted that the principle of 
sovereign incompatibility had not stopped the United States from continuing to 
recognize forms of internal self-government that it considers expressions of the 
residual sovereignty held by American Indian nations.111 
It is possible that this concurring opinion by Binnie J. may establish the 
framework for future decisions with regard to the sovereign nature of Aboriginal 
self-government, though it is not without its critics. Professor Gordon Christie 
has suggested that Binnie J.’s concurring judgment “stands as an illustration of so 
much of what is wrong in contemporary jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights.”112  
Generic versus Specific Rights—The Slattery Approach 
The approach to self-government outlined above would also be consistent with the 
approach to Aboriginal rights suggested by Brian Slattery and referred to earlier in 
this work.113 Professor Slattery divides Aboriginal rights into two groups. Generic 
rights are rights of a general nature and held by all Aboriginal groups that satisfy 
a certain criteria. The contours of the rights are determined by general principles 
of law. Specific rights, on the other hand, are distinct to Aboriginal groups and are 
based on the historic practices, customs, and traditions of the group in question. 
Specific rights fall into three categories: (1) site-specific rights attached to tracts 
of land, but do not equate to Aboriginal title such as historic hunting rights; (2) 
floating rights, which are land based but not attached to particular tracts of land 
such as the gathering of plants that may be of a restricted nature (Professor Slattery 
uses an example of plants that may be restricted by such things as the Food and 
Drug Act); and (3) cultural rights, which are grounded in historic practices but do 
not necessarily involve use of lands such as a right to traditional dancing.
Specific rights are determined based on a set of factors unique to the Aboriginal 
group claiming the right and they may be determined by use of the Van der Peet 
test. These rights consist of specific practices, customs, and traditions that are 
unique to the group claiming the right and can be proven as such. In Van der Peet, 
the Supreme Court concluded that Aboriginal rights could not be determined on a 
general basis. Rather, Lamer C.J. stated that the existence of an Aboriginal rights 
“will depend entirely on the practices, customs and traditions of the particular 
aboriginal community claiming the right.”114
However, in Delgamuukw the Court demonstrated a willingness to move away 
from this test, at least as it related to Aboriginal title. The appellant Gitksan and 
Wet’suwet’en Chiefs argued that Aboriginal title was tantamount to an inalienable 
fee simple and conferred upon the Aboriginal peoples the right to use the lands as 
they so choose. They further argued that this right was constitutionally protected 
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in Section 35. The Crown, on the other hand, argued that Aboriginal title repre-
sents nothing more than a bundle of rights to engage in activities that were, them-
selves, Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by Section 35. It was the rights 
themselves, and not the bundle that received constitutional protection according 
to this argument. A second option offered by the Crown was that Aboriginal title 
at best conferred upon the recipient a right to occupy and use the lands to engage 
in activities that were themselves Aboriginal rights.115
Seeking a middle ground, the Court concluded that Aboriginal title fell 
somewhere in between. While not the equivalent to fee simple, Aboriginal title, 
they concluded, was more than a bundle of rights or the right to engage in activi-
ties that were themselves Aboriginal rights. First, the Court concluded, Aboriginal 
title did encompass the right to exclusive use and occupation of the lands claimed 
under Aboriginal title. Second, the lands could be used for a variety of purposes, 
“which need not be aspects of those aboriginal practices, customs and traditions 
which are integral to the distinctive aboriginal culture.” The restriction placed on 
this use of lands was that they could not be used in a manner that was irreconcil-
able with the nature of the group’s attachment to the lands.116
Professor Slattery argues that this shift on the part of the Court represents the 
recognition of two different types of Aboriginal rights, specific and generic, and 
the recognition of Aboriginal title as a generic right. In examining the Supreme 
Court decision of Delgamuukw, Professor Slattery has stated: 
The crucial point to note here is that the Supreme Court treats 
aboriginal title as a uniform right, whose basic dimensions do 
not vary from group to group according to their traditional 
ways of life. All groups holding aboriginal title have fundamen-
tally the same kind of right, subject only to minor variations 
stemming from the inherent limit. In effect the Supreme Court 
recognizes that aboriginal title is not a specific right of the kind 
envisioned in Van der Peet, or even a bundle of specific rights. 
Aboriginal title is what we may call a generic right—a right of 
a standardized character that is basically identical in all aborigi-
nal groups where it occurs.117 
Professor Slattery argues convincingly that once established, a generic right is 
determined by the principles laid down in Canadian common law and that the 
contours of the right do not vary from group to group.118 As such, self-govern-
ment, once established as a generic right, would include whatever specific 
governing powers (or Aboriginal rights) had not previously been either ceded 
through treaties or extinguished through clear and plain legislation.
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Conclusion 
While it is unquestionably more practical for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
parties to seek resolution to questions of rights such as self-government through 
negotiated settlements, without the legitimacy provided by supporting decisions 
from the Court the parties are placed in a position of imbalance. As Professor Shin 
Imai has noted, “One function of the courts is to establish the broad legal param-
eters within which agreements can be made.”119 If one or other of the parties is 
able to play hardball at the negotiation table secure in the knowledge that the other 
is either not likely to seek judicial remedy or, alternatively, not likely to receive a 
practical judicial remedy, then the bargaining environment becomes more adver-
sarial and less likely to culminate in agreements. The Supreme Court decision in 
Pamajewon exemplifies this principle. Aboriginal negotiators are not likely to risk 
litigation if they are going to be forced to prove each aspect of self-government 
on a piecemeal basis. 
However, a second line of decisions associating the right of self-government 
to regulation may have rebalanced the playing field. Claiming a right to govern 
as a practical incident of the right to make communal decisions places Aboriginal 
governments in a much stronger bargaining position when it comes to negotiating 
agreements with provincial and federal governments. Finally, a deeper examina-
tion of the residual sovereignty argument might provide an even stronger bargain-
ing position for Aboriginal peoples. An ability to come to the bargaining table 
with the knowledge that sovereign powers lie with rather than against Aboriginal 
negotiators places them in strong position for negotiating.
The right of self-government is essential if Aboriginal communities are to 
address important developmental issues such as poverty, unemployment, lack of 
community infrastructure, and a widening socio-economic gap between Aborigi-
nal and non-Aboriginal Canadians. Professor Cornell and the people at the Harvard 
Project on American Indian Economic Development have clearly demonstrated 
the positive link between self-government and community success in the United 
States, and there is no reason why such success cannot be duplicated in Canada.
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the constitutional guarantee embodied in Section 35(1) which would incorporate ‘frozen rights’ 
must be rejected.” For commentary on this, see Dan Russel, A People’s Dream: Aboriginal Self-
Government in Canada (Vancouver: U.B.C. Press, 2000) 149; also, Ardith Walkem and Halie 
Bruce eds., Box of Treasures or Empty Box? Twenty Years of Section 35 (Penticton: Theytus 
Books, 2003). 
74 Sparrow, ibid., para. 29.
75 Sparrow, ibid., para. 82. 
76 Delgamuukw, supra note 6. 
77 Delgamuukw, ibid., para. 170.
78 Delgamuukw, ibid., para. 170. For a particularly scathing criticism of this approach, see John 
Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,” (1999) 37 
Osgoode Hall L. J. 537 at 575. Professor Borrows states, “The contrast in the Court’s treatment 
of Crown and Aboriginal sovereignty could not be more striking. The Court is willing to frame 
Crown rights to self-government in the most “excessive and general” of terms; simple utterances 
were enough to grant the Crown the widest possible range of entitlements to others’ ancient 
rights. On the other hand, detailed evidence concerning Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en sovereignty 
over specific people and territory (Houses, clans, chiefs, Feasts, crests, poles, laws and so forth) 
was too broad “to lay down the legal principles to guide future litigation.” 
79 MacFarlane J.A. stated, “In 1871 two levels of government were established in British Columbia. 
The division of governmental powers between Canada and the Provinces left no room for a third 
order of government.” Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1993), 104 D.L.R. (4th) 470, [1993] 
5 C.N.L.R. 1, [1993] B.C.J. 1395 (B.C.C.A.). It seems interesting that despite this clear-cut 
rejection of the issue of self-government by the lower courts the Supreme Court chose not to deal 
with the issue. It seems to make sense that if no such right existed the logical thing would have 
been to simply acknowledge agreement with the lower court’s ruling. 
80 Delgamuukw, supra, note 6, para. 115. 
81 Delgamuukw, ibid., para. 166. Kent McNeil has noted that while this limitation on Aboriginal 
title may prevent the lands from being used for certain activities such as strip-mining or clear-
cutting, this would not necessarily mean that an Aboriginal community could not engage in either 
mining or forestry activities so long as they were respectful of their stewardship role. See Kent 
McNeil, “Aboriginal Rights in Canada: From Title To Land To Territorial Sovereignty,” Tulsa J. 
Comp. & Int’l L. 5 (1998): 253 at 271.
82 McNeil, ibid., at 286. 
83 R v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, 177 D.L.R. (4th) 513, [1999] S.C.J. 55. [Marshall]. The 
accused in this case, Donald Marshall, had been wrongfully convicted of murder in 1971 and 
spent eleven years in prison prior to his exoneration.
84 R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, paras. 17 and 43, 179 D.L.R. (4th) 193[1999] S.C.J. 66. 
[Marshall 2].
85 Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 189 D.L.R. (4th) 333, [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1, [2000] B.C.J. 
1524. [Campbell]. 
86 Campbell, ibid., para. 81.
87 Campbell, ibid., para. 180. 
88 Campbell, ibid., para. 137. 
89 Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 245 D.L.R. (4th) 33, [2004] S.C.J. 70 
[Haida]. 
90 Haida, ibid., para. 56. 
91 Delgamuukw, supra note 6, para. 122.
92 Section 23 of the Charter grants minority language education rights to parents so their children 
may be educated in that family’s first language. In Mahe v. Alberta, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 342, para. 51, 
68 D.L.R. (4th) 69, [1990] S.C.J. 19 the Court concluded “The purpose [of s. 23 of the Charter] 
is to preserve and promote minority language and culture throughout Canada. In my view, it is 
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essential, in order to further this purpose, that, where the numbers warrant, minority language 
parents possess a measure of management and control over the education facilities in which their 
children are taught.”
93 Haida, supra note 91, para. 20.
94 See, Sparrow, supra note 5, paras. 67–82.
95 Felix Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (Charlottesville: Michie Bobbs-Merrill Publish-
ing, 1982) at 231.
96 See, United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) at 322–23; Also, Ex Parte Crow Dog, 109 
U.S. 556 (1883). 
97 Oliphant v. Squamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
98 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 574 (1823) [Johnson v. M’Intosh].
99 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1(1831) [Cherokee Nation v. Georgia].
100 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, ibid., 17.
101 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832) [Worcester v. Georgia].
102 Worcester v Georgia, ibid., 561.
103 United States v. Wheeler, supra note 98. 
104 See Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note 97, 246–57.  
105 Campbell, supra note 87, para. 180.
106 Campbell, ibid., para. 183. 
107 Mitchell v. M.N.R., [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, 199 D.L.R. (4th) 385, [2001] S.C.J. 33 [Mitchell].
108 Mitchell, ibid., para. 61.
109 Mitchell, ibid., para. 163. 
110 Binnie J. also cited military capacity as a right that could not be supported by Section 35(1) and 
thus, this would be one more bundle that would be removed from the residual package. See, 
Mitchell, ibid., para. 153.
111 Mitchell, ibid., para. 165.
112 Gordon Christie, “The Court’s Exercise of Plenary Power: Rewriting the Two-Row Wampum,” 
Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 16 (2002): 285 at 285. But also see Doug Moodie, “Thinking Outside the 20th 
Century Box: Revisiting Mitchell—Some Comments on the Politics of Judicial Law-Making in 
the Context of Aboriginal Self-Government,” Ott. L. Rev. 35 (2004): 1.
113 See Brian Slattery, supra note 71.
114 Van der Peet, supra note 22, para. 69. 
115 Delgamuukw, supra note 6, para. 111.
116 Delgamuukw, ibid., para. 117.
117 Brian Slattery, “What Are Aboriginal Rights” (Feb. 2007) CLPE Research Paper No. 1/2007, 
available online at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=967493> (last visited, December 10, 2008). 
118 Slattery, ibid., p. 21.
119 Shin Imai, “Sound Science, Careful Policy Analysis and Ongoing Relationships: Integrating 
Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal Land and Resource Disputes,” Osgoode Hall L. J. 41 
(2003): 587 
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